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ABSTRACT 
Product variety is an important strategic tool that firms can use to attract customers and respond to 
competition. This study focuses on the retail industry and investigates how stores manage their 
product variety, contingent on the presence of competition and their actual distance from rivals. 
Using a unique data set that contains all Best Buy and Circuit City stores in the United States, the 
authors find that a store’s product variety (i.e., number of stock-keeping units) increases if a rival 
store exists in its market but, in the presence of such competition, decreases when the rival store is 
collocated (within one mile of the focal store). Moreover, collocated rival stores tend to differentiate 
themselves by overlapping less in product range than do non-collocated rivals. This smaller and 
more differentiated product variety may be due to coordinated interactions between collocated 
stores. In summary, this article presents evidence of both coordination and competition in retailers’ 
use of product variety.  
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1. Introduction  
Managers in many industries use product variety as a strategic lever (Bayus & Putsis 1999; 
Sorenson 2000). This lever appears increasingly appealing in the retail industry, where more and 
more retailers have adopted “price match guarantees” (e.g., Best Buy, Sears, Staples, Vons, and 
sometimes Wal-Mart) and cannot resort to temporary price reductions as effectively as they might 
have in the past to attract consumers. Considerable research has studied why variety might 
theoretically benefit the firm (e.g., Kahn 1998a, b; Lancaster 1990, 1998) and examined empirically 
the benefits (e.g., Kekre & Srinivasan 1990) and costs of expanding variety (e.g. Randall & Ulrich 
2001). However, little research has focused on competition as a key determinant of product variety.  
Working in the context of retail competition for consumer electronics, we build on prior 
efforts (e.g. Olivares & Cachon 2009; Watson 2009) to study how competition influences product 
variety decisions. We extend these efforts by exploring two previously ignored variables: 
collocation and product range overlap. We address the following questions: Will a store change its 
level of product variety if a key competitor is present (versus not present) in its market area? Given 
such competition, does it matter if the competing store is collocated? Apart from the level of 
product variety, will collocation influence the extent to which the focal store’s product assortment 
overlaps with the competing store?  
We consider explicitly whether collocation, which strengthens competition and also may 
expand the market, influences product variety over and above the general presence of competition. 
Conventional studies on spatial competition presume that geographic proximity increases 
competition, and “heightened competition reduces rents for all” (Chung & Kalnins 2001, p. 969). 
But when collocated, firms also can enjoy agglomeration gains, because geographic concentration 
helps consumers reduce their search costs (Stahl 1982), and thus heightens demand for collocated 
stores (Cachon et al. 2008; McCann & Folta 2008). In part due to the agglomeration benefits, many 
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direct rivals—such as CVS and Walgreens, Home Depot and Lowe’s, Best Buy and Circuit City—
locate in the same shopping plaza or open stores across a street. Jackson Lan, the founder and 
former owner of the PC Club chain, was referred to by the Los Angeles Times (1999) as “the 
Strategist Next Door,” because from 1992 to 1999 he strategically located his 19 PC Club stores 
within walking distance of CompUSA, Best Buy, or Fry’s Electronics. His rationale was that this 
copycat location strategy not only helped PC Club attract foot traffic but also avoided overspending 
on advertising campaigns and market research about where to locate. Our focus on collocated 
competition allows us to see how the interplay of these contrasting forces affects rival stores’ 
product variety decisions. Moreover, no previous studies have ever examined whether collocated 
competitors differentiate more by reducing the extent of product range overlap than do non-
collocated competitors. We probe both the level and composition of product variety, that is, the 
number of variants and the proportion of overlapping products with competitors. This initial 
exploration of product range overlap and our unique focus on collocation constitute the primary 
contributions of our research.  
Our research is further distinct from prior work in that our data set covers every retail outlet 
of the two largest specialty consumer electronics retail chains in the U.S. in 2006, Best Buy and 
Circuit City. With this extensive data set, we provide a more expansive and pertinent research 
setting than most previous work (e.g., Watson 2009). Since the time of our data collection, Circuit 
City has declared bankruptcy and exited the market.1 However, this industry setting in 2006 offered 
two key benefits for our study. First, the competitive dynamics between Best Buy and Circuit City 
showcased the importance of product variety and were potentially representative of many pairs of 
U.S. and international retail chains (e.g., CVS versus Walgreens, Wal-Mart versus Carrefour). 
                                                 
1 On November 10, 2008, Circuit City filed for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 11, followed by store closures and 
layoffs. When we first collected the data in November 2005, Circuit City was in no sign of trouble. According to Circuit 
City's quarterly earnings filing with the U.S. Security and Exchange Commission, during the last quarter of 2005, it was 
still profitable (net earnings $10 million) and issuing dividends. 
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Second, the location and in-store product variety information for each Best Buy and Circuit City 
store was available on their Web sites and updated frequently. Advanced computer search and data 
collection techniques enabled us, through great effort, to retrieve and compile information with 
better reliability than would be possible through manual data collection. 
Our investigation reveals that a store’s product variety increases significantly when a rival 
store appears in the local geographic market (within a ten-mile radius of the focal store). However, 
given the presence of such competition, the focal store’s product variety decreases relative to non-
collocated competition when the rival store is collocated (within one mile). Moreover, collocated 
stores are more inclined to differentiate themselves by overlapping less in product assortments than 
do pairs of distant rivals. This smaller and more differentiated product variety implies the possibility 
of coordinated interactions between collocated stores.2 Their coordinated behavior can blunt their 
competition and allow both stores to reap agglomeration benefits by attracting more consumers with 
lower stocking costs. In summary, we document empirically that both coordination and competition 
with rivals occur in retailing and that product variety, in terms of both level and overlap, can be 
managed strategically to adapt to the competitive environment. 
We organize the remainder of this article as follows: We review literature on the motives for 
and consequences of changing product variety in Section 2. In Section 3, we describe a simple 
model to illustrate our intuitions and propose several hypotheses about how a store’s product variety 
(level and overlap) might change according to the competition and collocated competition it faces. 
We outline the empirical methodology in Section 4 and present the empirical results in Section 5. 
Finally, we discuss implications of the key results, our contributions and limitations, and some 
directions for further research.   
                                                 
2 We avoid the term “implicit collusion,” which implies antitrust violations. The terms “coordination” and “coordinated 
interaction” come from the Horizontal Merger Guidelines of the U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade 
Commission. 
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2. Prior Literature  
Research from many disciplines, including economics, marketing, operations management, and 
strategy, indicates that product variety can help firms attract customers and respond to competition. 
Previous empirical studies report the benefits of high-variety strategies, such as sales increases 
(Kekre & Srinivasan 1990), higher prices (Pigou 1920), and enhanced survival rates (Sorenson 
2000). Yet launching and maintaining a large product variety incurs considerable costs, due to 
higher inventory levels (Kekre 1987), the loss of scale economies, and the imposition of supply-
chain market mediation (Randall & Ulrich 2001).  
The benefits of product variety may derive from several sources. Marketing scholars have 
identified consumer-based motivations for an increase in product variety (for reviews, see Kahn 
1998a; McAlister & Pessemier 1982). If each consumer knows his or her preference precisely in a 
product category and chooses the same option repeatedly, “more variety in [the] product line will 
make it more likely that each consumer finds exactly the option he or she desires” (Kahn 1998b, p. 
46). Alternatively, when consumers make different choices over time, especially in low-
involvement, low-risk product categories, they may seek variety to meet their intrinsic drive for 
stimulation (Raju 1980) or satisfy their curiosity about novel things (Hirschman 1980). In both 
scenarios, greater product variety can increase customer satisfaction and loyalty. Lancaster (1998) 
also suggests some information- and producer-based motivations for increasing variety. An 
incumbent firm may offer product variety that exceeds “some long-run market equilibrium,” (P.4) if 
it can attain economies of scope by doing so or if it lacks information about consumer preferences 
and therefore needs to offer as many products as possible to find out which ones consumers prefer. 
Moreover, greater product variety can establish barriers to entry, in that the incumbent firm 
preemptively fills all potential market gaps in which an entrant could have entered, as empirically 
documented by Putsis and Bayus (2001) in the personal computer industry. 
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 Despite this good understanding of the consequences of and theoretical motives for 
increasing product variety, little empirical research has examined product variety as a strategic tool 
for responding to competition. Most studies focus on pricing, not product variety, as a competitive 
instrument (e.g., Mazzeo 2002; McGahan & Ghemawat 1994; Thomadsen 2007). The few extant 
studies on product variety competition focus on the impact of competitors’ actions and market 
structure on firm-level variety. For example, Bayus and Putsis’s (1999) investigation of the personal 
computer industry during 1981–1992 shows that if competitors broaden their product line, firms 
also should increase their product variety. Berry and Waldfogel (2001) examine commercial radio 
stations in 243 U.S. markets in 1993 and 1997 and find that the greater concentration of ownership 
in a market, wrought by the 1996 Telecommunications Act, was associated with an increase in per-
firm product variety (i.e., number of different programming formats relative to the number of 
competitors in a market).  
Somewhat more related to our study, in their investigation of more than 200 U.S. General 
Motors dealerships, Olivares and Cachon (2009) find that dealers carry more inventory when they 
face more competition (measured as the number of dealerships in a local geographic market). 
Watson’s (2009) analysis of the display inventories of eyewear retailers in the Midwestern U.S. 
presents contrasting results at two levels: At the market level, average per-retailer variety decreases 
with the number of rivals; at the retailer level, when more rivals are located nearby, retailers first 
stock more product variety before eventually reducing the level. Building on these two recent 
studies, we aim to paint a richer picture of product variety competition by exploring two new 
directions: collocated competition and the extent of assortment overlap. 
3. Model and Hypotheses 
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We model how stores change their product variety in a market that includes two direct, mutually 
acknowledged competing retail stores (Chen 1996).3 Because many retail stores, such as Best Buy 
and Circuit City, offer “price match guarantees,” we do not focus on price competition4 and instead 
place our emphasis on how rival stores interact with one another by choosing appropriate product 
variety levels.  
3.1. The Model  
Consider a local geographic market consisting of two competing stores that carry product 
varieties ௜ܸ and ௝ܸ to attract consumers (i, j=1, 2, i് j). We begin by specifying the demand function 
of each store based on a set of assumptions. First, a store’s absolute product variety drives up its 
own demand by increasing the likelihood that store visitors can find products to match their tastes 
(Kahn 1998b). We use ௜ܸఈ to describe how store i’s product variety influences its demand. Second, 
carrying more product variety than a competitor store increases the likelihood that consumers will 
choose to visit the focal store, which in turn increases the focal store’s market share and demand 
(Shugan 1989). We use ൫ ௜ܸ ௝ܸ⁄ ൯
ఉ
to capture how the relative variety between store i and j influences 
store i’s demand, such that a larger ߚ represents a more competitive market. Third, if the competing 
store is located close enough to the focal store, an agglomeration effect may occur. This 
agglomeration effect suggests that additional product variety by the proximate rival helps increase 
the focal store’s demand. We use ௝ܸఊ to capture this agglomeration effect, with a larger ߛ indicating 
                                                 
3 Chen (1996) posits that a competitor analysis is based on two factors: whether firms have similar types and amounts of 
resources (resource similarity) and whether they compete in many markets that are important to them (market 
commonality). If firms have both high resource similarity and market co mmonality, they are direct and mutually 
acknowledged competitors (e.g., Sony and Toshiba, Coke and Pepsi, Best Buy and Circuit City). 
4 To validate the point, we collected price data in March 2006 for all Best Buy and Circuit City stores in two product 
categories: digital cameras and televisions. We conducted paired t-tests on the prices of digital cameras and televisions 
and found no significant difference in price (p = 0.53 for digital cameras, 0.66 for televisions). Specifically, for digital 
cameras, the average paired price difference between the two chains is 0.23% of the price, and 47% of the matched 
products have same prices at both chains. For televisions, the average paired price difference is 0.45% of the price, and 
36% of products have equal prices. Note that even though we observe very small differences in regular prices, larger 
differences in promotional prices might arise.  
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a stronger agglomeration effect. Putting these components together, we follow Shugan (1989) and 
adopt the commonly used multiplicative functional form to set up store i’s demand function: 
                                                                    ܳ௜ ൌ ܭ ௜ܸ
ఈ ൬௏೔
௏ೕ
൰
ఉ
௝ܸ
ఊ     i, j=1,2, i്j,   (1) 
where ܳ௜ is store i’s demand; K is a constant that represents store i’s absolute market potential; ߙ 
denotes the marginal effect of own variety on demand; ߚ represents the level of competitive 
intensity; and ߛ is the marginal agglomeration effect on demand. In a competitive market, all these 
parameters are strictly positive, whereas in a monopoly market that includes only one store, both 
competition and the agglomeration effect disappear (ߚ ൌ 0 and ߛ ൌ 0).  
The profit of store i in turn is: 
                                                       Π௜൫ ௜ܸ, ௝ܸ൯ ൌ ܭ ௜ܸ
ఈ ൬௏೔
௏ೕ
൰
ఉ
௝ܸ
ఊ െ ଵ
ଶ ௜ܸ
ଶ     i, j=1,2, i് j,   (2) 
where ଵ
ଶ ௜ܸ
ଶdenotes store i’s costs of carrying product variety ௜ܸ (e.g., inventory, transportation, 
opportunity cost of shelf space).5 Based on the demand and profit functions, next we analyze three 
questions: (1) How does a store change its product variety if a competitor exists in its local 
geographic market? (2) In a competitive market, do collocated rivals differentiate more in their 
product range than do distant rivals? and (3) How do rival stores that compete in the market change 
the level of product variety if they are collocated? We provide the proofs in Appendix 1. 
3.2. Product Variety and the Presence of Competition  
In this subsection, we compare store-level product variety in a competitive market to that in 
a monopoly market. In a competitive market, each competitor chooses its own product variety to 
maximize its own profit. In other words, the problem for each store is max
V౟
 Π୧ሺV୧, V୨ሻ(i, j=1,2, 
i്j).Solving the profit maximization problems of both stores allows us to propose:  
                                                 
5 The coefficient is added for mathematical convenience and does not change the results substantively. We use a 
quadratic cost function for the uniqueness of the solution. Such a cost function is commonly employed to describe the 
increasing costs of operation as input increases (Mas-Colell et al. 1995). 
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PROPOSITION 1. In a competitive market there exists a symmetric equilibrium: Each store 
chooses the optimal variety ௜ܸכௗ ൌ ሾܭሺߙ ൅ ߚሻሿ
భ
మషഀషം (i=1, 2). In a monopoly market, the optimal 
product variety of the monopolistic store is ௜ܸכ௠ ൌ ሺܭߙሻ
భ
మషഀ . It holds that  ௜ܸכௗ ൐ ௜ܸכ௠ . In addition，
߲ ௜ܸ
כௗ ߲ߚ⁄ ൐ 0. 
 
Proposition 1 suggests that the optimal variety of a competitive store is always greater than 
that of a monopolistic store. More generally, a store’s optimal product variety increases with the 
level of competitive intensity ሺߚሻ, and a monopoly market is a special case when competition 
disappears. The intuition behind this proposition holds that more product variety contributes to store 
demand and profit because it is more likely that each consumer finds his or her most preferred style 
(Kahn 1998b), and more variety allows each consumer to enjoy a diversity of options (McAlister & 
Pessemier 1982). In a competitive market, any store that lags behind its competitor in providing 
variety faces the consequences of lower demand and lower profits. Because of such an “arms race,” 
both stores must provide higher levels of variety than either would have provided in a monopoly 
market of the same size. Accordingly, we empirically test the following hypothesis: 
H1: A store’s product variety increases if a rival store competes in the same market. 
3.3. Differentiation and Collocated Competition  
 We now focus on the case of a competitive market. We explore the possibility that rival 
stores may differentiate themselves using their product ranges, and we examine how the extent of 
differentiation varies when rival stores are collocated. A store can differentiate by carrying fewer 
products that also are available at the competitor’ store (overlapping products) and/or increasing the 
number of products that the competitor does not carry (non-overlapping products). Differentiation 
softens competition (Mazzeo 2002; Porter 1991). It can also strengthen the agglomeration effect: If 
a store adds an overlapping product, the total product variety of both stores remains unchanged. In 
contrast, if a store differentiates by introducing a non-overlapping product, the total product variety 
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increases, which further reduces consumer search costs and enhances the attractiveness of the 
overall marketplace.  
We introduce a parameter ߠ to capture the impact of differentiation (or the reverse of 
product range overlap) on competition and the agglomeration effect.6 We assume that ߠ ൒ 1, with 
ߠ ൌ 1 representing no differentiation and ߠ ൐ 1 denoting the existence of differentiation. The profit 
function in Equation (2) can be rewritten as follows:      
                                                  Π௜൫ ௜ܸ , ௝ܸ , ߠ൯ ൌ ܭ ௜ܸ
ఈ ൬௏೔
௏ೕ
൰
ഁ
ഇ
௝ܸ
ఊఏ െ ଵ
ଶ ௜ܸ
ଶ         i, j=1,2, i്j,        (3) 
where we divide ߚ by ߠ to indicate that differentiation reduces competition and multiply ߛ by ߠ to 
show that differentiation increases the agglomeration gain.7 Again we solve the profit maximization 
problems of the two rival stores and obtain each store’s optimal variety and corresponding profit.  
PROPOSITION 2. A symmetric equilibrium exists such that each store chooses the optimal 
variety ܸ݅כ ൌ ቂܭ ቀߙ ൅
ߚ
ߠ
ቁቃ
1
2െߙെߛߠ to earn profit Π௜כ ൌ ቂܭ ቀߙ ൅
ఉ
ఏ
ቁቃ
మ
మషഀషംഇ  ቈ ଵ
ఈାഁ
ഇ
െ ଵ
ଶ
቉ (i=1, 2). As a result,  
(a).  ߲Π௜
כ ߲ߠ⁄ ൐ 0. That is, a store’s equilibrium profit increases with the level of differentiation.  
(b).  డ
డఉ
ቀడΠ೔
כ
డఏ
ቁ ൐ 0, డ
డఊ
ቀడΠ೔
כ
డఏ
ቁ ൐ 0. That is, the positive impact of differentiation on profit is greater 
when there is more competition and an agglomeration effect. 
 
Proposition 2(a) suggests that because more differentiation leads to higher store profit, stores 
have an incentive to differentiate. Proposition 2(b) indicates that this incentive is stronger when 
stores face higher levels of competition and agglomeration gains, two features associated with 
collocation. On the one hand, when rival stores are collocated (e.g., in the same shopping plaza), 
transport cost across collocated stores declines to nearly nothing, which should reduce consumers’ 
                                                 
6 We treat differentiation (denoted by the parameter ߠ) as a choice variable that needs to be coordinated by both stores. 
Because it can be adjusted only slowly through coordination, in the short run it can be treated as fixed, as we do in 
deriving our Proposition 3. Moreover, note that for Proposition 2, we only model a one-period game in which rival 
stores may or may not coordinate to such extent that makes the level of differentiation consistent with the equilibrium. 
This type of coordination, however, is most likely to occur when rival stores interact repeatedly, as is true in our 
empirical study.   
7 To model the differential impacts of differentiation on ߚ and ߛ, we also could write ߚ/߬ߠ (߬ߠ ൒ 1) and ߛߪߠ ሺߪߠ ൒
1. In this case, ߬, ߪ indicate the differential magnitude of impact. For parsimony though, we assume ߬ൌ1 and ߪൌ1, 
without loss of generality. 
. 
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switching costs and thereby increase the intensity of the rivalry between the sellers (ߚ ՛). On the 
other hand, the demand-heightening agglomeration effect emerges with collocation ( ߛ ՛). 
Differentiation helps dampen the more fierce competition between collocated stores and further 
enhances the agglomeration gains by increasing the collocated region’s total product variety, 
thereby contributing to store profits to a greater extent. As a result, collocated stores are more 
inclined than distant rivals to differentiate. In line with Proposition 2, we submit:  
H2: Given competition in a market, collocated rivals are more likely than distant rivals 
to differentiate by reducing their product range overlap. 
3.4. Product Variety and Collocated Competition  
Many rival retailers have coexisted for a long time and are likely to interact repeatedly. 
Some rival retailers even become increasingly similar in their resources and markets (Chen 1996), 
as exemplified by Best Buy and Circuit City in our empirical setting. Repeated interaction among a 
few similar players encourages coordination (Tirole 1988, p. 240). In choosing its competitive 
tactics then, a store must take into account not only the possible increase in short-term profits but 
also the possibility of long-run losses from the rival’s retaliation in the future. Moreover, when rival 
retailers encounter each other in multiple geographic markets, they need to weigh gains in one 
market against dangers of retaliation in other markets. Such multimarket contact can blunt the 
incentives for rivalry and further facilitate coordination (Tirole 1988, p.243).  
We now use a simple case to demonstrate why coordination can result in lower product 
variety at each store. If two rival stores coordinate fully, they no longer behave non-cooperatively to 
maximize their individual profit. Instead, their combined problem becomes choosing product 
variety levels ሺV୧כୡሻ to maximize joint profits. For a given level of differentiation (ߠ), the common 
objective shared by two rival stores is maxVభ,Vమ  ሾΠଵሺVଵ, Vଶ|θሻ ൅ ΠଶሺVଵ, Vଶ|θሻሿ. By solving this 
problem we are able to state:  
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PROPOSITION 3. V୧כୡ ൏ V୧כ for a given level of ߠ. That is, the optimal product variety when 
both stores fully coordinate is smaller than that when each store acts non-cooperatively with the sole 
objective of maximizing its own profit.  
 
Proposition 3 shows that the respective product variety of two fully coordinated rivals is 
smaller than the optimal level chosen by two rivals that do not coordinate (i.e., competitive level of 
variety). Because two fully coordinated stores choose variety levels to maximize their joint profits, 
they are not engaged in a harmful “arms race” to add extra product variety and attract customers 
away from the competition, which also would incur higher stocking costs. Instead, two rival stores 
behave as if they were one big store, each offering a lower product variety to reduce costs.  
Such full coordination is more likely in collocation conditions. When collocated, rival stores 
forego the possibility of differentiating through locations and confront more fierce competition, 
which can reduce each other’s profitability (Chung & Kalnins 2001). They thus have greater 
incentives to develop an implicitly coordinated market (Shugan 1985) to mitigate such head-to-head 
competition. If one of the stores defects from the coordinated interaction by increasing product 
variety, it may enjoy an immediate gain from the defection, but it will suffer a punishment loss in 
the future because the collocated rival can detect its defection easily and retaliate by escalating its 
own product variety. Compared with distant rivals, collocated rivals can access each other’s updated 
status, carrying costs, and planned product variety moves more easily through in-store visits, 
informal daily communications, and personal networks among employees, thereby reducing the 
information lag and encouraging rapid retaliation. The smaller information lag and quicker 
retaliation associated with collocation make the implicit coordination more likely to be sustainable 
(Tirole 1988, p.241). Considering the collocated stores have both the motivation and the capability 
to coordinate effectively, we conclude that collocation may lead to lower level of product variety.  
H3a:  Given the existence of a rival store in a market, a focal store’s product variety 
decreases if the rival store is collocated. 
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Yet fully coordinated stores also might choose a level of differentiation that differs from the 
level chosen by non–fully coordinated stores. In other words, ߠ may not be the same in the two 
cases. When we factor in this potential variation in differentiation, it is unclear whether V୧כୡሺθሻ ൏
V୧
כሺθሻ still holds.8 This adds ambiguity to predictions about product variety level under collocation.  
Intuitively, such ambiguity can be explained as a result of two intertwined tendencies of 
collocated rivals: on the one hand, compared with distant competing stores, collocated rivals tend to 
differentiate more (as predicted by Proposition 2) by carrying fewer overlapping and/or more non-
overlapping products; on the other hand, they are also inclined to offer a smaller product variety to 
save stocking costs (as discussed in H3a). When rival stores are collocated, consumers can search 
both stores with little transport cost and purchase from either, therefore what may be more 
important to consumers is the total product variety of both stores (i.e. the sum of two stores’ 
varieties less the number of overlapping products), rather than each store’s variety. Two possible 
scenarios then emerge: If collocated rival stores differentiate mainly by carrying fewer overlapping 
products, even though each store offers a lower product variety, the total product variety of two 
collocated rivals can still stay at the same level as that of distant rivals. However, if collocated 
stores differentiate primarily by carrying more non-overlapping products, then each store’s 
respective variety may not decline. Instead, with the addition of non-overlapping products, each 
store likely offers a larger variety, as a result of which the total product variety of the collocated 
region becomes even higher than that of the distant rivals. Because this second scenario suggests the 
possibility that collocated rival stores may increase both individual variety and differentiation, we 
submit a new hypothesis that competes with H3a: 
H3b: Given the existence of a rival store in a market, a focal store’s product variety 
increases if the rival store is collocated. 
                                                 
8 Our proof in Appendix 1-section 3.2 shows that V୧כୡሺθሻ ൏ V୧כሺθሻ may not hold when the level of differentiation (θ) in 
the fully coordinated case differs from that in the non-fully coordinated case. 
 13
4. Research Design 
4.1. Data 
 We collected data of Best Buy and Circuit City in 2006 from their Web sites, 
www.bestbuy.com and www.circuitcity.com. Using a Web crawling program, we retrieved the 
address of each Best Buy and Circuit City store in the U.S. (including Alaska and Hawaii) as of 
March 2006. Another Web crawling program collected in-store product variety information for each 
Best Buy and Circuit City store in a single product category, digital cameras. To ensure that the data 
crawling processes wrapped up within the same day to minimize any possible changes in the 
product information, we used 20 computers that extracted Web pages simultaneously. To verify 
data accuracy, we interviewed several store managers, who confirmed the consistency between their 
actual in-store product variety and the information listed online. We also manually collected 
product variety information in the digital camera category by visiting several stores; we found no 
difference between the hand-collected information and the data collected using our Web crawling 
program. In 2006, Best Buy maintained 710 stores and Circuit City had 619 stores, so we have 
1,329 observations for the digital camera product category.  
We delineate local markets according to the method proposed by Zhu and Singh (2009). The 
U.S. Census partitions each county into sub-regions called census tracts.9 Because the address of 
each store is available, we can map each store onto the corresponding census tract using the Census 
Bureaus’ TIGER/Line files. We then draw a circle of ten-mile radius around each store’s location, 
with the presumption that this distance represents a relevant area in which each store potentially 
competes with other stores. In Figure 1, we flesh out the details of a local market, which we define 
as the ten-mile circle around the focal store, across a number of tracts. In our data set, each market 
covers 35 tracts on average. Figure 2 depicts the locations of all the stores in our data. 
                                                 
9 More detailed information about the definition and basic characteristics of census tracts also is available at 
http://www.census.gov.  
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[Insert Figures 1 and 2 about here] 
4.2. Measures 
Before going into detail about variable measurements, we explain how we define a pair of 
competitors. First, using each store’s address, we find the latitude and longitude of each store.10 
Second, we calculate the spherical distance between a focal store and each store of the rival chain. 
Third, we select the rival store that is the shortest distance from the focal store and define these two 
stores as a pair of competitors for our study.  
Our research considers two dependent variables. We measure the total product variety of 
each store (PV) as the logged number of SKUs in the digital camera product category. SKUs 
provide a good measure of product variety from the perspective of consumers. According to Fader 
and Hardie (1996), SKU choice is a more fitting description than brand for consumers’ purchase 
decision processes, because consumers typically choose among SKUs on the basis of various 
product attributes, one of which is the brand. We use a log transformation because the number of 
SKUs exhibits approximately log-normal distributions in our data.  
To capture the extent of product range overlap, we compare and match the detailed product 
descriptions (e.g., model numbers, major attributes) of both chains.11 We next count the number of 
overlapping SKUs for each store and its nearest competitor (COMPV). We then take into account 
the possibility that if the universe of SKUs in a particular market is higher, the likelihood of overlap 
is larger by random probability.12 Following the spirit of the dartboard approach proposed by 
                                                 
10 The primary online source of our information was http://terraserver-usa.com. This Web site is now renamed as 
http://msrmaps.com.  
11 In some consumer electronics categories, manufacturers put different model numbers on identical products sold to 
different retailers to soften downstream price competition. Digital camera manufacturers sometimes do so across global 
markets. We do not observe such practices in the digital camera category across the two retail chains in the U.S. market 
though. In our data set, based on the product information extracted, we find that no identical products are sold under 
different names at these retailers. The SKUs differ in tangible features, including brand name, design type, megapixels, 
optical versus digital zoom, and so on  
12 We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this possibility. Imagine the total universe of SKUs is 100. One 
pair of stores stocks 30 SKUs, and another pair of stores stocks 50. For a pair of stores, if we randomly assign their 
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Ellison and Glaeser (1997), we measure product range overlap for each pair of stores as the raw 
number of overlapping SKUs, less the randomly drawn overlap.  
 ܱܸܧܴܮܣ ௜ܲ ൌ logሺܥܱܯܲ ௜ܸሻ െ logሺܴܽ݊݀݋݉ ܥܱܯܲ ௜ܸሻ
ൌ logሺܥܱܯܲ ௜ܸሻ െ log ቀ
݊஺݊஻
ܰ
ቁ  
(4) 
The elements of the calculation are as follows: For two competing stores, A and B, Store A has ݊஺ 
SKUs and Store B has ݊஻ SKUs. The overlapping (߯) and non-overlapping SKUs of both stores and 
the total universe of SKUs in a particular market N are: 
 SKUs available in Store B  
Yes No Row Sum 
SKUs 
available in 
Store A 
Yes ݔ  ݊஺ െ ݔ ݊஺ 
No ݊஻ െ ݔ 
ܰ െ ݊஺ െ ݊஻
൅ ݔ ܰ െ ݊஺ 
 Column Sum ݊஻ ܰ െ ݊஻ ܰ
13 
 
The actual number of overlapping SKUs is ݔ, but the expected number of overlapping SKUs based 
on probability is ௡ಲ
ே
ڄ ௡ಳ
ே
ڄ ܰ ൌ ௡ಲ௡ಳ
ே
 . 
Our two independent variables are indicator variables that indicate whether a competitor 
exists (COMP) and is collocated (COLLOCATE) in a given market. We code COMP as 1 if the 
distance between a focal store and its nearest rival store is not greater than 10 miles—that is, if a 
competitor of the focal store appears within the ten-mile circle—and 0 otherwise. Following 
Rosenthal and Strange (2003), we code COLLOCATE as 1 if the nearest rival store is within 1 mile 
of the focal store, and 0 otherwise. By defining these two variables, we can categorize our 1,329 
observations into the following types of market structures: 191 observations appear in the no local 
competition category (COMP = 0), and 1,138 observations reveal local competition (COMP = 1); 
                                                                                                                                                                  
SKUs to the 100 possible cells (throw darts at 100 cells), the likelihood of overlap is smaller for the first pair than for 
the second pair of stores, because we would throw two sets of 30 compared with two sets of 50 darts.  
13 The total universe of SKUs varies by local market. We also use the total universe of SKUs across all geographic 
markets to measure N. That universe is the same for both Best Buy and Circuit City, that is, 80 product variants in total. 
Our data analysis results hold with this alternative definition of the total universe of SKUs.  
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within this competitive category, 609 observations indicate collocated competition (COLLOCATE 
= 1, COMP = 1), and 529 reveal non-collocated competition (COLLOCATE = 0, COMP = 1).  
As a control variable, we use an indicator variable for Best Buy stores (BESTBUY), which 
captures the store-specific characteristics of the Best Buy chain, such as its organizational culture, 
reputation, standard customer service, store cleanliness, employee training, and friendliness. We 
also add two market-level demographic variables calculated from census data: INCOME (log of 
medium household income in a market) and POPDEN (population density in a market, or the size of 
the population per square kilometers/1000). Both INCOME and POPDEN relate to a market’s 
product variety; the former indicates potential income constraints on purchasing behavior (Hoch et 
al. 1995), and the latter affects the market’s demand level and relative profitability (Watson 2009). 
Finally, we control for several demographic variables that may describe the market conditions, 
namely, average household size (HHSIZE), the fraction of the population with a college education 
(COLLEGE), the fraction of the population over 18 years of age (ADULT), the fraction of male 
residents (MALE), and the fraction of consumers who are non-white (NONWHITE). The 
demographic data reflect Census information for tracts within the local market, which we aggregate 
to the market level by taking weighted averages using tract-level population as the weight. If store 
i’s local market (defined as its ten-mile radius) overlaps with the markets of many other stores, we 
identify common tracts shared by these n + 1 stores. We then divide the demographic data of those 
common tracts by n + 1, such that the shared tracts are equally allocated to nearby stores. This 
adjustment ensures each store’s local market is mutually exclusive from other stores’ markets. In 
Table 1, we provide summary and descriptive statistics for all the variables in this study. The 
product variety and overlap profile for each type of market structure is presented in Table 2.   
[Insert Tables 1 & 2 about here] 
4.3. Statistical Method 
 17
To estimate how competition affects a store’s product variety, we would normally estimate 
the model: 
ܲ ௜ܸ ൌ ߜ௢ ൅ ߜଵܥܱܯ ௜ܲ ൅ ௜ܺ߱ ൅ ߝ௜                                                                                (5) 
where COMP is the key independent variable that indicates whether a competitor for a focal store i 
appears in a given market, ߱ is a coefficient vector, and iX  is a vector of control variables that 
might influence product variety (e.g., demographic variables that describe market-level consumer 
taste heterogeneity). However, we must allow for the possibility that the presence of competition in 
the market (COMP = 1), like product variety, depends on market-level control variables. 
Unobservables that are not included in the vector of control variables in Equation (5) can yield 
biased and inconsistent estimates of the coefficient for COMP using an ordinary least squares 
(OLS) estimation (Greene 1990: 591-659).  
To address the potential endogeneity of COMP, we use the instrumental variables (IV) 
method. We first apply a Probit model to estimate the probability that there exists a competitor for a 
focal store in a given market as a function of the exogenous (predetermined) demographic variables.  
The functional form we choose is:  
 Prሺܥܱܯ ௜ܲ ൌ 1|ܼ௜ሻ ൌ Φሺܼ௜ߜሻ (6a) 
where Φሺ·ሻis the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution and ܼ௜ 
includes BESTBUY, INCOME, POPDEN, and the demographic variables (MALE, ADULT, 
COLLEGE, NONWHITE, and HHSIZE) that may affect market demand and thus are related to the 
level of competition in a given market. We then use the predicted value from Equation (6a) (ܥܱܯܲ෣ ) 
as an instrumental variable for COMP in Equation (6b), the equation of primary interest:  
ܲ ௜ܸ ൌ ߜூ௏௢ ൅ ߜூ௏ଵܥܱܯ ௜ܲ ൅ ௜ܺ߱ூ௏ ൅ ߝ௜                                                                 (6b) 
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where ௜ܺ includes BESTBUY, INCOME, POPDEN, and four demographic variables (MALE, 
ADULT, COLLEGE, and NONWHITE) that reflect a market’s diversity in gender, age, education, 
and ethnicity and thus relate to the market’s aggregate taste for variety.  
Such IV estimations require at least one “extra” explanatory variable that influences the first 
stage but not the second stage, which is often referred to as the exclusion restriction requirement 
(Wooldridge 2002). We include the demographic variable HHSIZE in the first-stage Probit model 
but exclude it from the second stage. Household size should relate to market demand and affect the 
number of stores in this market, which suggests that we should include this variable in the Probit 
model. Product variety, the dependent variable in the second stage, primarily depends on consumer 
heterogeneity in a market. But HHSIZE does not capture the heterogeneity across households and 
therefore should not directly influence product variety.14  
To examine how a collocated competitor, compared with a non-collocated competitor, 
affects product variety and product range overlap, we conduct similar IV estimations that account 
for the endogeneity of COLLOCATE on a subsample of only competitive cases with the following 
second-stage functional forms: 
ܱܸܧܴܮܣ ௜ܲ ൌ ߜூ௏௢ ൅ ߜூ௏ଵܥܱܮܮܱܥܣܶܧ௜ ൅ ௜ܺ߱ூ௏ ൅ ߝ௜                                       (7) 
ܲ ௜ܸ ൌ ߜூ௏௢ ൅ ߜூ௏ଵܥܱܮܮܱܥܣܶܧ௜ ൅ ௜ܺ߱ூ௏ ൅ ߝ௜                                                            (8) 
5. Results and Robustness Checks  
We provide the results of the IV estimations in which we examine the impact of COMP or 
COLLOCATE on product variety in Table 3.15 We report the results of Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests, 
                                                 
14 We note two additional points regarding the exclusion restriction requirement. First, this restriction is not absolutely 
required in our case, because we use Probit—a nonlinear, binary response model—in the first stage to generate our 
instrumental variable (Amemiya, 1985). Although the nonlinearity of the first-stage Probit model allows our second-
stage equation to be technically identified, we go further and apply the restriction requirement to make the source of the 
identification clearer. Second, our estimation results remain intact regardless of whether we include this “extra” variable 
in the first stage.  
15 The results of the first-stage Probit models that we used to generate the instrumental variables can be obtained from 
the authors upon request.  
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which confirm the endogeneity of the COMP and COLLOCATE variables and indicate that their 
coefficients, if estimated by OLS, should differ significantly from those of the IV estimations.  
Model 1 contains the IV estimation results for the impact of competition on product variety. 
As expected, the coefficient of COMP is positive and highly significant (ߜூ௏ଵ ൌ 0.045, with a t-
statistic of 2.65), in support of H1; that is, the existence of a competing store is associated with 
greater total product variety of a focal store. If we hold the other regressors equal, the average 
number of product variants in a competitive market (COMP = 1) is five percent (= 05.01045.0 =−e ) 
higher than in a market without competition (COMP = 0). Model 2 reports the IV estimations of the 
impact of collocation on product range overlap for only competitive cases. The IV coefficient of 
COLLOCATE is negative and statistically significant (ߜூ௏ଵ ൌ െ0.346, with a t-statistic of -2.20), 
which implies that a store is less likely to carry overlapping products when the competitor is 
collocated. All else being equal, the average extent of product range overlap by collocated 
competitors is approximately 29 percent (ൌ 1 െ ݁ି଴.ଷସ଺ ൌ 0.29) lower than that carried by non-
collocated competitors (COLLOCATE = 0). H2 is thus supported. Model 3 presents the IV 
estimation results of the impact of collocated competition on product variety for competitive cases. 
The coefficient of the COLLOCATE variable in Model 3 is negative and significant (ߜூ௏ଵ ൌ
െ0.214, with a t-statistic of -2.18); that is, collocated competitors carry a smaller product variety 
than do non-collocated competitors, in support of H3a. When the other regressors remain constant, 
collocated competitors (COLLOCATE = 1) display a level of product variety that is approximately 
19 percent ( 19.01 214.0 =−= −e ) lower than non-collocated competitors. 
 The control variables have some effects of interest. For example, Best Buy stores display a 
lower level of product variety than Circuit City stores, and when they collocate with their nearest 
competitors, they differentiate slightly more than do Circuit City stores by displaying a lower level 
of product range overlap. A higher fraction of male residents in a market is associated with lower 
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product variety, which implies that men’s tastes tend to be more homogenous than are women’s. In 
the full sample analysis (Model 1), we also find that markets with higher income levels, larger 
population sizes, and larger fractions of adults display higher levels of product variety.   
We use several alternative specifications to test the robustness of our results. First, there are 
some highly urbanized areas such as New York City, Chicago, and Boston, which we label as 
“superurban” areas, where competitors may be more likely to collocate within one mile. In other 
areas, competing stores may not collocate as much and instead coexist only within ten miles. Thus, 
the effects we have observed for the independent variables COMP and COLLOCATE might reflect 
not the impact of competitive proximity but rather whether the store is located in a superurban area. 
To control for the effects of these superurban areas, we generate an indicator variable 
SUPERURBAN that equals 1 if the focal store’s Zip Code is categorized by Census 2000 to be in a 
Core Based Statistical Area (CBSA) that can be subdivided into two or more “metropolitan 
divisions” (and 0 otherwise).16 The estimation results with this variable included, as shown in 
Models (4)–(6) in Table 3, still support H1, H2, and H3a. We also run the analysis on the subsample 
that includes only the non-superurban areas. The results in Models (7)–(9) in Table 4 indicate that 
all our major findings still hold in this subsample.  
Second, we change the collocation cut-off point from 1 mile to 0.5 miles. The results using 
this alternative measure, as reported in Models (10) and (11) in Table 4, support both H2 and H3a. 
We also use the distance from rival as a continuous measure for the degree of collocation and find 
that geographically closer rivals tend to overlap less and each carries a smaller product variety. This 
finding is consistent with the results when collocation is measured as non-continuous variables. 
                                                 
16 With the Zip Code information of each store, we collected the corresponding Micro, Metro, and CBSA Division data. 
A CBSA is the official term for a functional region based around an urban center of at least 10,000 people, based on 
standards published by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in 2000. A CBSA is broken into Micro and Metro 
subcategories, depending on population densities. To be considered a Micro area, the population must be between 
10,000 and 50,000. A Metro area’s population must exceed 50,000. If a Metro area contains an urbanized area of at least 
2.5 million people, it can be subdivided into two or more “metropolitan divisions.” Of our 1329 stores, 385 are in areas 
with “metropolitan divisions,” which we call superurban areas.  
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 Third, we define a local geographic market as the 15-mile radius of a focal store. With a 
larger market, we can explore competitive dynamics in non-superurban areas, where stores may 
locate farther away from one another. After recalculating all the market-level demographic variables, 
we repeat the analyses from Model (1)–(11); all the results still hold.  
 Finally, we note the possible impact of the presence of Wal-Mart, which sells consumer 
electronics too. Nationwide data indicate that approximately 3,000 Wal-Mart stores existed in the 
U.S. in March 2006 (recall that there were 710 Best Buy and 619 Circuit City stores). Therefore, at 
least one Wal-Mart store appears in every defined local market we study, and the presence of Wal-
Mart is a common factor for all our data observations. This form of competition therefore cannot 
explain our findings. Moreover, our findings continue to receive support after we control for the 
distance (as a measure of the extent of collocation) from Wal-Mart. 
[Insert Tables 3 & 4 about here] 
6. Discussion and Conclusions 
6.1. Implications of Major Findings 
A store’s product variety expands significantly if a rival store exists in its market. In a 
competitive market, each rival store has an incentive to add product variety, beyond the level that it 
would have stocked had it been a monopolist. This larger variety can enhance customer satisfaction 
and loyalty, as well as encourage customers to switch away from competing stores. This first key 
finding generally parallels existing studies. For example, Lancaster (1990) shows theoretically that 
a monopoly, facing no competition, should produce the least product variety of any market 
structures. In a study of the video rental market in a district of Edmonton, Alberta, de Palma et al. 
(1994) find that centrally located stores, which face the most competition, tend to offer more 
product variety than do stores on the market boundaries.  
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In the presence of competition, collocated rival stores tend to differentiate more than distant 
rivals do by overlapping less in product range. Firms within the same industry often collocate (e.g., 
hotels, Baum & Haveman 1997; Chung & Kalnins 2001; footwear producers, Sorenson & Audia 
2000; new biotechnology firms, Zucker, Darby, & Brewer 1998). Our data pertaining to the retail 
consumer electronics industry show that more than half (609 of 1,138) of the stores for two 
competing chains collocate (within 1 mile). Collocation is associated with more fierce competition 
and agglomeration benefits, but through differentiation, rival stores can reduce their losses due to 
competition and reap more gain from agglomeration. The pattern that differentiation reduces 
competition is consistent with the prediction from industrial organization (Mazzeo 2002; Porter 
1991). Similarly, Baum and Haveman (1997) find that new Manhattan hotels tend to locate 
geographically close to established hotels that differ in size, such that the competition loss due to 
spatial proximity can be offset by a gain through differentiation. 
Our empirical findings also show that collocated rival stores introduce smaller product 
variety than non-collocated stores. We attribute the smaller product variety to the possible existence 
of coordinated interactions between collocated stores. At the time of our study, Best Buy and 
Circuit City engaged in multimarket contacts, such that their competitive actions and responses 
spread over many geographic markets. 583 of the 710 Best Buy stores in our data competed with a 
rival Circuit City store in their 10-mile radius, and 555 of the 619 Circuit City stores faced such 
competition from Best Buy. Both theoretical (Matsushima 2001) and empirical (Baum & Korn 
1996; Gimeno & Woo 1999) research shows that such multimarket contacts encourage mutual 
forbearance and enhance firms’ ability to sustain coordination. Our two focal stores also likely 
encountered repeated competitive games in a single market, and collocation increased the intensity 
of their rivalry, as well as the speed and effectiveness of potential retaliation. Thus, defection from 
this cooperative interaction offers small gain, whereas coordination offers more long-term, 
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sustainable benefits (Shugan 1985; Tirole 1988). This coordination in product variety is similar to 
the coordination through pricing in retail gasoline markets that Borenstein and Shepard (1996) 
describe.   
Another explanation for collocated rivals’ smaller product variety is that a greater level of 
differentiation may help maintain the total variety of collocated stores, even if each store decreases 
its level of product variety. Our extended data analysis suggests that more differentiation (less 
overlap) in our research setting is associated with less store-level product variety.17 Moreover, when 
we calculated the total product variety for each pair of rival stores, we found that the total variety 
for collocated rivals is not significantly different from that for distant rivals,18 in line with the first 
scenario we discussed in relation to H3b. When each store’s product variety is small but contains 
little overlap, the total product variety of both stores may still benefit consumers as much as when 
each store offers a large product variety but also a lot of overlap.  
6.2. Contributions and Future Research Directions 
We make several contributions to existing research. First, this study is the first to use a 
nationwide data set from chain stores (for which price variations are reasonably well controlled) to 
study the impact of competition on product variety. Casual observation of the growth of chain-store 
retailing suggests that a key success factor is its ability to satisfy consumer tastes with a broad range 
of products. Yet actual empirical studies are rare and quite recent, mostly because of the difficulty 
of collecting nationwide, cross-sectional data about product variety choices. Existing studies (e.g., 
de Palma et al., 1994; Watson 2009) focus on non-chain stores in a specific region, despite the 
                                                 
17 The impact of differentiation on store-level product variety is theoretically indeterminate, as discussed in relation to 
H3b.To examine empirically how differentiation affects the level of product variety, we analyze the data by adding the 
variable “overlap” to the second-stage IV estimation of Model (6). The coefficient of overlap is significantly positive at 
the 1% level (t-statistic = 3.15), suggesting that more differentiation is associated with less variety. The collocation 
coefficient remains significantly negative (t-statistic = -2.17). 
18 A t-test (t = -0.209, p = 0.84) confirms that the total product variety of collocated rivals is not significantly different 
from that of distant rivals. We also conduct further analysis by changing the dependent variable in Model (6) from 
store-level product variety to the total variety of two competing stores. This IV estimation shows that the coefficient of 
collocation does not have a significant impact on the total product variety (with t statistic of -1.29).  
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prevalence of retail chains in many markets. In contrast, we include all the stores of two competing 
chains nationwide, as well as the potential systematic pattern that chain stores may exhibit when 
they determine store-level product variety.  
Second, we document and analyze the degree of overlap in the product ranges of 
geographically proximate competitors, which represents the first attempt to study the interaction 
between such overlaps and spatial competition. By investigating product range overlap, we 
acknowledge the nuances of retail stores’ product variety decisions. Moreover, whereas extant 
research (e.g., Baum & Mezias 1992; Baum & Singh 1994) examines differentiation along 
dimensions such as geographic location, organizational traits (e.g., size), price, product features, or 
quality, we offer a new perspective for studying firms’ differentiation. 
Third, our study complements extant research by proposing collocation as an important 
moderator in the context of spatial variety competition. Collocation has a particular effect on 
product variety; the smaller and differentiated product variety in collocated stores implies that they 
attempt to forbear from aggression and engage in coordinated interaction. We find evidence of 
mutual forbearance or coordinated interaction in prior studies that concentrate on pricing (Parker & 
Röller 1997), market entry, growth, and market exit (Baum & Korn 1996; Haveman & Nonnemaker, 
2000), but no prior work documents these concepts along product variety dimensions. 
 The limitations of our study provide directions for future research. We focus only on one 
product category (digital cameras) which is characterized by substantial heterogeneity in consumer 
preferences and requires relatively high inventory costs. Scholars can examine if a similar pattern of 
product variety competition can be found in categories like televisions, major home appliances, 
personal computers, office equipment, and large automobile parts. We also restrict our analysis to 
two competitors; allowing for multiple competitors and incorporating the effect of firm 
characteristics (e.g., size, age, and decision-making system) would greatly extend our research. 
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Furthermore, we do not consider possible interactions between product variety and other 
competitive tools, such as price. Future research could add other actions, such as price variations 
(both regular and promotional) and advertising campaigns, to determine how they might interact 
with product variety. Finally, our study and several other works (e.g., Olivares & Cachon 2009) 
suggest the possibility of using abundant online information as a plausible data source. We 
recommend that more researchers consider online data as a promising source.  
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Figure 1: Details of a Local Market 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Locations of Best Buy and Circuit City Retail Stores in our Data 
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Table 1: Summary and Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
(N = 1,329, March 2006 digital camera full sample) 
Variable Description Mean S.D. Min Max
Dependent Variables 
PV  Logged number of a store’s product variety 
(SKUs)  
3.604 0.145 3.135 3.932 
OVERLAP Logged number of common products (i.e. 
products carried by a store and its nearest 
competitor) minus logged number of randomly 
drawn common products
-0.583 0.147 -1.306 -0.277 
Independent Variables 
COMP Indicator = 1 if a store’s distance from its 
nearest competitor ≤ 10 miles 
0.856 0.351 0 1
COLLOCATE Indicator = 1 if a store’s distance from its 
nearest competitor ≤ 1 mile 
0.458 0.498 0 1
Control Variables 
BESTBUY 
 
Indictor variable for Best Buy stores 0.534 0.499 0 1
INCOME 
 
Median household income in a market (US$, 
logged units) 
10.780 0.227 10.149 11.421
POPDEN 
 
Population density in a market (population size 
per square kilometers/1000) 
0.653 0.889 0.003 8.381
COLLEGE 
 
Decimal fraction of the population with a 
college education in a market 
0.192 0.066 0.054 0.460
ADULT  
 
Decimal fraction of the population older than 
18 years in a market 
0.744 0.031 0.647 0.859
MALE             Decimal fraction of male consumers in a 
market 
0.487 0.011 0.461 0.570
NONWHITE        
 
Decimal fraction of consumers who are non-
White in a market 
0.254 0.144 0.021 0.830
HHSIZE  Average household size in a market 2.678 0.241 2.188 3.749 
SUPERURBAN Indicator variable for “superurban” market 0.290 0.454 0 1 
 
Table 2: Product Variety and Overlap by Market Structure 
Market Structure  # of Obs. a Average # of 
store-level 
SKUs 
Average # of 
overlapping 
SKUs b 
Average # of 
non-overlapping 
SKUs b 
Average # of total 
SKUs b  
Monopoly 
 
191(186) 35.6 N/A N/A N/A 
Non-collocated 
Competition  
529 (509) 37.4 14.0 23.4 61.1 
Collocated 
Competition 
609 (601) 37.4 13.7 23.8 61.2 
a  In column (2), the number in each parenthesis refers to the number of observations in which the overlapping, non-
overlapping, and total SKUs data are available. b Columns (4)-(6) apply only to the competitive markets where for each 
pair of rivals, we compare the product range overlap and calculate the total variety of both stores. Note that the total 
variety is the sum of both stores’ SKUs less the number of overlapping SKUs. 
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Table 3: Models of the Impact of Competition and Collocated Competition on Product Variety  
  
 
 All areas included 
 
Superurban effect controlled 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent Variable PV Overlap PV PV Overlap PV 
       
CONSTANT 2.810*** 
(0.272) 
 
0.252 
(1.280) 
4.435*** 
(0.820) 
3.046*** 
(0.293) 
-0.361 
(0.669) 
4.296*** 
(0.722) 
COMP a 0.045*** 
(0.017) 
  0.046*** 
(0.017) 
  
COLLOCATE a   -0.346** 
(0.157) 
-0.214** 
(0.098) 
 -0.308** 
(0.157) 
-0.168* 
(0.092) 
       
BESTBUY -0.218*** 
(0.005) 
-0.022* 
(0.013) 
-0.220*** 
(0.008) 
-0.218*** 
(0.005) 
-0.021* 
(0.013) 
-0.219*** 
(0.008) 
INCOME 0.103*** 
(0.020) 
0.033 
(0.079) 
0.019 
(0.050) 
0.081*** 
(0.023) 
0.052 
(0.074) 
0.019 
(0.044) 
POPDEN 0.006* 
(0.003) 
-0.007 
(0.011) 
0.001 
(0.006) 
0.003 
(0.004) 
-0.005 
(0.010) 
0.001 
(0.005) 
COLLEGE -0.074 
(0.069) 
-0.267 
(0.181) 
-0.032 
(0.114) 
-0.043 
(0.070) 
-0.273 
(0.175) 
-0.007 
(0.103) 
ADULT 0.397*** 
(0.118) 
0.315 
(0.346) 
0.005 
(0.227) 
0.348*** 
(0.120) 
0.362 
(0.324) 
0.025 
(0.199) 
MALE -1.067*** 
(0.245) 
-2.420*** 
(0.753) 
-1.595*** 
(0.482) 
-0.998*** 
(0.247) 
-2.340*** 
(0.742) 
-1.417*** 
(0.447) 
NONWHITE -0.012 
(0.022) 
0.048 
(0.065) 
-0.072* 
(0.043) 
-0.021 
(0.022) 
0.058 
(0.061) 
-0.066* 
(0.038) 
SUPERURBAN    0.016** 
(0.007) 
-0.003 
(0.019) 
 
0.012 
(0.011) 
# of Obs. 1329 1110 b 1138 1329 1110 b 1138 
Durbin-Wu- 
Hausman Test 
χ²(1)=7.87 
(p=0.005) 
 
χ²(1)=9.92 
(p=0.002) 
 
χ²(1)=12.32 
(p=0.000) 
 
χ²(1)=7.91 
(p=0.005) 
 
χ²(1)=6.90 
(p=0.009) 
 
χ²(1)=6.82 
(p=0.009) 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis.  
***Significant at the 1% level. **Significant at the 5% level. *Significant at the 10% level.  
a Predicted values of COMP and COLLOCATE from the 1st-stage Probit analyses are the instrumental variables for 
COMP and COLLOCATE respectively. b The competitive subsample for Models (3) and (6) contains 1,138 
observations, but only 1,110 contain product range overlap information, so n = 1,110 for Models (2) and (5).
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Table 4: Selected Models for Robustness Check 
 
 Only non-superurban 
areas included 
 
Superurban  effect controlled,  
“Collocate” as ≤ 0.5 miles 
 (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Dependent 
Variable 
PV Overlap PV Overlap PV 
      
CONSTANT 3.073*** 
(0.354) 
 
-0.121 
(1.104) 
4.575*** 
(0.789) 
0.531 
(1.534) 
4.946*** 
(1.039) 
COMP a 0.075*** 
(0.024) 
    
COLLOCATEa   -0.254* 
(0.144) 
-0.199** 
(0.101) 
-0.452** 
(0.230) 
-0.303** 
(0.151) 
      
BESTBUY -0.209*** 
(0.007) 
-0.020 
(0.014) 
-0.209*** 
(0.010) 
-0.022 
(0.015) 
-0.219*** 
(0.010) 
INCOME 0.060** 
(0.028) 
0.042 
(0.077) 
-0.031 
(0.055) 
0.025 
(0.092) 
-0.014 
(0.062) 
POPDEN -0.011 
(0.014) 
0.006 
(0.026) 
-0.006 
(0.018) 
-0.005 
(0.012) 
-0.002 
(0.008) 
COLLEGE -0.023 
(0.088) 
-0.032 
(0.221) 
0.214 
(0.155) 
-0.152 
(0.218) 
0.072 
(0.146) 
ADULT 0.425*** 
(0.148) 
0.062 
(0.354) 
-0.068 
(0.251) 
0.011 
(0.480) 
-0.234 
(0.325) 
MALE -0.776*** 
(0.297) 
-1.827*** 
(0.679) 
-0.912* 
(0.485) 
-2.508*** 
(0.906) 
-1.643*** 
(0.612) 
NONWHITE 0.007 
(0.028) 
0.094 
(0.064) 
-0.016 
(0.046) 
0.085 
(0.067) 
-0.054* 
(0.045) 
SUPERURBAN    -0.004 
(0.023) 
 
0.012 
(0.015) 
# of Obs. 944 754b 771 1110c 1138 
Durbin-Wu- 
Hausman Test 
χ²(1)=12.06 
(p=0.001) 
 
χ²(1)=4.43 
(p=0.035) 
 
χ²(1)=8.99 
(p=0.003) 
 
χ²(1)=10.67 
(p=0.001) 
 
χ²(1)=15.63 
(p=0.000) 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis.  
***Significant at the 1% level. **Significant at the 5% level. *Significant at the 10% level.  
a Predicted values of COMP and COLLOCATE from the 1st-stage Probit analyses are the instrumental variables for 
COMP and COLLOCATE respectively. b The competitive subsample that includes only non-superurban areas 
for Model (9) contains 771 observations, but only 754 contain product range overlap information, so n = 754 for 
Model (8). c The competitive-only subsample for Models (11) contains 1,138 observations, but only 1,110 
contain product range overlap information, so n = 1,110 for Models (10). 
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Appendix 1: Proofs of Propositions  
Part 1: 
There are two competing stores, Store 1 and Store 2, in a market.  Each store’s profit function is: 
                                                          Π௜൫ ௜ܸ , ௝ܸ൯ ൌ ܭ ௜ܸ
ఈሺ௏೔
௏ೕ
ሻఉ ௝ܸ
ఊ
ᇣᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇥ
ொ೔൫௏೔,௏ೕ൯
 െ  ଵ
ଶ ௜ܸ
ଶ
ถ
஼೔ሺ௏೔ሻ
        i, j=1, 2, i് j (1) 
Solving the first order conditions (F.O.Cs) with respect to ܸ݅ (i=1, 2), we obtain each store’s optimal 
variety and the corresponding profit. 
௜ܸ
כௗ ൌ ሾܭሺߙ ൅ ߚሻሿ
ଵ
ଶିఈିఊ 
                                                                      Π௜
כௗ ൌ ሾܭሺߙ ൅ ߚሻሿ
మ
మషഀషം  ቀ ଵ
ఈାఉ
െ ଵ
ଶ
ቁ i=1, 2  (2) 
Assumptions:  
(1) ܭ ൒ 1/ߙ such that ௜ܸכௗ ൒ 1. (2) α ൅ β ൏ 2 such that the cost function of variety is more convex and 
the optimal profit Π௜כௗ is bounded. (3) β ൐ ߛ such that a competing store’s variety has a stronger business-
stealing effect than the agglomeration effect; in other words, ߲Π௜ ߲ ௝ܸ ൏ 0⁄ . 
 
PROPOSITION 1. ߲ ௜ܸכௗ ߲ߚ⁄ ൐ 0.  
PROOF.  
This proposition is an immediate consequence of the expression for  ௜ܸכௗin Equation (2), since following 
ߙ ൅ ߚ ൏ 2, ߚ ൐ ߛ, we obtain that ߙ ൅ ߛ ൏ 2.       □ 
 
Part 2: 
We now introduce ߠ with ߠ ൐ 1denoting the existence of differentiation. Each store’s profit function 
becomes Equation (3). Solving the F.O.Cs with respect to ܸ݅ (i=1, 2), we obtain each store’s optimal 
variety and the corresponding profit as shown in (4). 
 
                                                              Π௜൫ ௜ܸ , ௝ܸ,ߠ൯ ൌ ܭ ௜ܸ
ఈ ൬௏೔
௏ೕ
൰
ഁ
ഇ
௝ܸ
ఊఏ െ ଵ
ଶ ௜ܸ
ଶ            i, j=1, 2, i് ݆    (3) 
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൰൨
ଵ
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ఏ
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మ
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ఈାഁ
ഇ
െ ଵ
ଶ
ቇ   i=1, 2              (4) 
Assumptions:  
(1) ܭ ൒ 1/ߙ such that ௜ܸכ ൒ 1. (2) α ൅ β/θ ൏ 2 such that Π௜כ is bounded. (3) β/θ ൐ ߛߠ such that ∂Π௜ /
߲ ௝ܸ ൏ 0. 
 
PROPOSITION 2. (a). ߲Π௜כ ߲ߠ⁄ ൐ 0,(b). ߲ሺ߲Π௜כ ߲ߠ⁄ ሻ/߲ߚ ൐ 0, ∂ሺ߲Π௜כ ߲ߠ⁄ ሻ/߲ߛ ൐ 0.  
PROOF.  డ௟௡ஈ
כ
డఏ
ൌ ቂ݈݊ܭ ቀߙ ൅ ఉ
ఏ
ቁቃ ଶఊ
ሺଶିఈିఊఏሻమ
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ഇ
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ഇ
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ഇ
ቁሺଶିఈିఊఏሻ
 >0 
                                                                ֜ ߲Π௜
כ ߲ߠ⁄ ൐ 0                   (5) 
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        ֜ ߲ሺ߲Π௜כ ߲ߠ⁄ ሻ/߲ߚ ൐ 0      (6) 
߲ቀ߲݈݊Π
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2 כ ߚߠ
ሺ2 െ ߙ െ ߛߠሻଶ ൬ߙ ൅ ߚߠ൰
 
                                   ൐
2
ሺ2 െ ߙ െ ߛߠሻଶ
൞ln ൤ܭ ൬ߙ ൅
ߚ
ߠ
൰൨ െ
ߚ
ߠ
൬ߙ ൅ ߚߠ൰
ൢ 
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19, we have ߲ ቀ߲݈݊Π
כ
߲ߠൗ ቁ ߲ߛൗ ൐ 0 
                                                       ֜ ߲ሺ߲Π௜
כ ߲ߠ⁄ ሻ/߲ߛ ൐ 0     (7) 
Based on (5) (6) (7), we conclude the proof of Proposition 2.     □ 
 
Part 3: 
3.1. 
PROPOSITION 3. V୧כୡ ሺFully coordinated varietyሻ ൏ V୧כ (Non-fully coordinated variety) for a given ߠ.   
PROOF.                                               maxVభ,Vమ  ሾΠଵሺVଵ, Vଶ|θሻ ൅ ΠଶሺVଵ, Vଶ|θሻሿ                                     
                                                       ൌ  maxVభ,Vమ ቈܭ ଵܸ
ఈ ቀ௏భ
௏మ
ቁ
ഁ
ഇ
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Differentiating (8) with respect to Vଵ, Vଶ and solving both F.O.C.s, we obtain, 
                                                              Vଵ
כୡ ൌ  Vଶ
כୡ ൌ ሾKሺα ൅ γθሻሿ
భ
మషಉషಋಐ.     (9) 
As we assume ߛߠ ൏ ఉ
ఏ
,  we have V୧כୡ ൏ V୧כ ൌ ቂK ቀα ൅
ஒ
஘
ቁቃ
భ
మషಉషಋಐ.  
We thus complete the proof of Proposition 3.       □ 
 
3.2. PROOF. 
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For notational convenience, let Z ൌ ஒ/஘
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ഇ
ቁቃ
 .  
We find an upper bound for ߛ, that is,  ߛഥ ൌ ௓ሺଶିఈሻ
ሺଵା௓ሻఏ
.   
If ߛ ൏ ߛҧ, we have ߲݈݊Vכ ߲ߠ ൏ 0.⁄                            ֜ ߲ ௜ܸכ ߲ߠ⁄ ൏ 0                 
If ߛ ൐ ߛҧ, we have ߲݈݊Vכ ߲ߠ ൐ 0.⁄                            ֜ ߲ ௜ܸכ ߲ߠ⁄ ൐ 0              (11) 
With (10) and (11), we prove the inequalities in footnote 8 and in relation to H3b: 
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௫
 .  
